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Discussion of Factors Controlling Army Helicopter Reliability
Abstract
The Army's interest in significant aviation improvements actually started, or at least gained steam, in the
1960's during the extended combat we had in southeast Asia where a lot of problems in the utilization of the
rotary wing aircraft came to a head, and I'll talk about those in more detail. What I would like to do is go
through how the Army has responded to those problems that were revealed, through R&D and even more
specifically in the diagnostics area. When I say diagnostics, what I'm talking about is the second category of
NDI that I see, the first category being the one I think that most people here have a prime interest in and that
is the one time, static inspection during manufacture, a verification of quality control. The other type is the
repetitive in-service inspection.
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DISCUSSION OF FACTORS CONTROLLING ARMY 
HELICOPTER RELIABILITY 
K. Rummel 
Boeing Vertol Company 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
and 
T. House 
Eustis Directorate 
U.S. Army Materials Research and Development Laboratory 
I'm Kirk Rummel from Boeing Vertol. 
from the Eustis Directorate of USAAMROL, 
ed to present this paper and was looking 
this very fine group. He apologizes for 
Tom House, 
had intend-
forward to 
not coming. 
What we would like to do is try to show the 
Army's program in the diagnostics area; specifically, 
I hope I can respond to some of the challenges that 
Charlie Smith threw out about having a logical ap-
proach to research planning. 
The Army's interest in significant aviation im-
provements actually started, or at least gained 
steam, in the 1960's during the extended combat we 
had in southeast Asia where a lot of problems in 
the utilization of the rotary wing aircraft came to 
a head, and I'll talk about those in more detail. 
What I would like to do is go through how the Army 
has responded to those problems that were revealed, 
through R&D and even more specifically in the diag-
nostics area. \~hen I say diagnostics, what I'm 
talking about is the second category of NDI that I 
see, the first category being the one I think that 
most people here have a prime interest in and that 
is the one time, static inspection during manufac-
ture, a verification of quality control. The other 
type is the repetitive in-service inspection. 
I think there's a lot of differences in those 
two categories. The first is very obvious: there 
are high levels of funding, and secondly, 
there appears to be a good deal of technology inter-
change which, quite seriously, draws my envy. I 
think that's one of the messages that you have given 
me from this symposium; that we need to do a much 
better job of technology transfer in this latter 
area of in-service diagnostics. 
I do want to diverge just for a moment to ex-
press my appreciation of what I observe is the high 
caliber of the work being performed. The scientific 
progress that you're making is obviously quite con-
siderable. Perhaps this paper addresses more of the 
engineering rather than the scientific aspects of 
NDI. 
I would like to become more specific and talk 
about the approach that some 1 ike to ca 11 "defi-
ciency oriented." It starts with problems rather 
than solutions, and on Fig. 1 is a simple outline 
of what I think is the generic approach to problem 
solution. I don't want to insult your intelligence 
but rather remind you of this fundamental aspect 
of good engineering application. I want to show it 
because I think all too frequently we start at step 
6 and go to 8 or at least try to get to 8 and have 
to return eventually to 1 through 5. It's very 
important that we move on down that order in a very 
sequential manner, attempting to be as quantitative 
as possible, particularly in steps 2 and 3. I 
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think quantitative assignments there can be either 
in a delta expression or in an absolute value. The 
material I'm going to show you, I hope, will adhere 
to that requirement that all of our goals are 
quan tita ti ve. 
1. DEFINE REQUIREMENTS. 
2 I ESTABLISH VIORKABLE GOALS. 
3. ASSESS CURRENT POSITION. 
q, REVIEW ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. 
5. PERFORr1 PRELit1IrlARY EVALUATIONS. 
6,, DETAILED RESEARCH. 
7. EVALUATE BEST CANDIDATES. 
8. INCORPORATE. 
Figure 1. Process fnr Droblem solution. 
. Figure 2 is a distribution of maintenance costs. 
Th1s does not include fuel and crew. It happens to 
be on our CH-47. A thousand dollars an hour for 
any helicopter and I think there's where we start 
with the problem. 
CHOACIISIEXPERIENCE 
PUTS --------U21/HOUR 
PERSONN[L _______ S173/KOUR 
TOTALIIII.I.INHHAHC[ COSl-SIOOitHOUR 
POWERPLAHT 132.4',] 
Figure 2. Distribution of CH-47A parts cost by 
subsys tern. 
The distribution of subsystems may be of some 
surprise to some of you. I have seen a great deal 
of emphasis on the airframe structures here; it's 
a small segment of that pie: the engine, the rotors, 
the drive system are the big contributors. Another 
display of the problem is Fig. 3 which is of in-
flight aborts on the UH-1. Here we see a slightly 
different subsystem distribution, the hydraulics 
there is a little bigger because. of the single hy-
draulic boost system that the UH-1 has which makes 
the operator a bit more sensitive to hydraulic in-
dications. Those are both false and real indica-
tions, I might remind you. 
Figure 3. Subsystem causes of UH-lH Mission Aborts. 
Figure 4 displays maintenance man hours per 
flight hour. Here I think you begin to realize some 
of the impact of scheduled inspections. Now, remem-
ber, that's organizational level maintenance man 
hours per flight hour. We're doing an awful lot of 
inspection. 
Figure 4. Distribution of MMH/FH for CH-47A by 
subsystem. 
239 
I don't have a chart, unfortunately, of acci-
dents. The chart I had in mind to present had the 
simple message that rotary wing aircraft are 
considerably higher than fixed wing aircraft. Our 
goal is to bring it down to the fixed wing level 
and we think we can, at least on a realistic basis 
of accidents per landings. 
In Army aviation, we're generally talking 
about goals, showing a factor of two improvement. 
In other words, we want to cut tha·t experience by 
half. Now, that's rather optimistic, but I think 
you'll see in some of the later presentations that 
it's achievable. 
Moving on from aircraft level display, let's 
follow the thread down through the transmission that 
we saw as a rather large contribution to aborts and 
maintenance man hours. In Fig. 5, you see a distri-
bution of TBO (Time Between Overhaul) or scheduled 
removals, component failure deterioration,and false 
removals due to inadequate diagnostics. 
TBO 
REMOVALS 
43% 
COMPONENT 
DETERIORATION 
44% 
TRANSMISSION REMOVALS (CH-47 EXPERIENCE) 
Figure 5. Drive system major constraints. 
Now, Charlie Smith alluded a little bit in the 
previous presentation to some of the work the 
Army is trying to do, which I'm proud to say I was 
a part of, in applying more rigorous analytical 
criteria for determining when and if we should have 
TBO removals. I don't want to explore that now, 
but just to throw one, perhaps controversial, thought 
out; our analysis has concluded that, in general, 
we do not have to have any additional diagnostics 
to allow our transmissions to go on-condition. If 
you want to pursue that with me later, I'll be glad 
to. It's a rather fundamental concept and some have 
had a hard time accepting it. 
The inherent reliability of component deterio-
ration is being addressed by many Army programs both 
in terms of material capabilities and, in fact, non-
destructive inspection techniques that would improve 
reliability. 
I want to concentrate on our efforts to reduce 
false removals through improved diagnostics. Before 
I do that, let me turn to a tabular list of accidents 
caused by transmissions. Figure 6 represents all 
Army rotary wing aircraft. It's a composite of 
many different aircraft. The top level causes are 
the lubrication starvation induced failures which 
Landing Mode 
P (Accident/ 
loss of structural 
integrity) 
P(Accident/ 
power loss) 
P (Accident/ 
contrOlled pre-
cautionary landing) 
P (Accident/ 
normal landing) 
(~Rvn) {:::;conus) ! 
1/3 l/3 
l/10 l/100 
1/2.000 1/4,000 
1/60,000 l/120, 000 
we have addressed through many design improvements-
redundant jets and last chance screens, etc., in Figure 7. Accident probabilities. 
new aircraft. 
Co.panent 
Sc:av,.nqc Line 
Lubrication starvation induced 
Box spewed oil; inhaled by engine causing turbine failure 
Seizure - Lube starvation :Local) Input Pinion Bearing 
Input Pinion Bcarir.g 
Input Pinion Gear 
Input Pinion Be011.ring 
F'ilter Leak 
Seizure - Lube starvation (local) residual contamination 
Locknut backed off - Lube !ltarvlltion of bearinq-blocked oil je 
SeizuiC'e - Lube starvation: filter studs pulled out 
Input Pinion Bearing 
Gear Tooth 
Gear Scuffing 
Gear Pitting 
Impt"opel:"ly t"euscd gaskets lea):; badly 
Seizure and subsequent oil-fed fire - Lube otarv11tion 
ft"om quick disconnect failure 
Possibly gear failure due to law lube - POssibly stained 
siqht glass led to maintenance misreadin'il' level 
Tooth fal.lu~:es due to lube problems (cOC!I!Ion) 
First stage bevel gear pitting cloqs pW!Ip 
lsolated causes 
Quill Shaft Cracking through improper l-" machined hole in shaft 
Bevel Gear Crack th~:ough mounting flange due to material incluaion 
Bevel Gea~: Retent Failures o! bevel gear retention cap screv 
Stud Falluu Stud fatigue failure due to bending on hard landings 
Cont~:ol YoKe Gross rotor imbalance or blade loss caused yoke failures 
Mounting Stude Transmission left aircraft - MOunting studs !ailed 
Repetitive causes 
Slippage and resultant rpn loss 
Figure 6. Transmission/gearbox accident history. 
The isolated causes are the one time events 
that are experienced, and down at the bottom is one 
of the few repetitive causes we see that create 
accidents, that is, clutch slippage. It's a parti-
cular insidious mode that so far has resisted any 
diagnostic technique to determine when the clutch 
is going to slip. Any sudden loss of power in a 
rotary wing aircraft is disturbing, particularly if 
it occurs as you are coming in for a landing. One 
of the things I want you to notice are the cracks 
we have had in shafting and bevel gears, and these 
are of concern to us, although, as you can-see, 
they are isolated cases. They have not heretofore 
been detectable through debris monitoring because 
they simply don't generate debris until it's too 
late. 
The next consideration that we ran into in 
looking at accidents, and this is what Charlie Smith 
was alluding to when he talked about the impact of 
precautionary landings, are the accidents which are 
simply due to misexecuted precautionary landings. 
The potential for these accidents is shown on 
Fig. 7. 
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The third category in Fig. 7 is the accidents 
due to the control]ed precautionary landings which 
occur in one in 2,000 landings to one in 4,000 
landings. Now, that simply says the world is not 
a pool table and you're going to land on a stump 
once in a while, but your criteria for an adequate 
diagnostic system depends on your recognition of 
this. 
In Fig. 8 is illustrated the methodology we have 
been developing tD determine how the probability 
of an accident, giVen a precautionary landing, 
could affect the requirements for a reliability 
objective on your diagnostic system. What we show 
is that the accident rate can go up as the reli-
ability of your diagnostic system goes down, and 
indeed, in certain kinds of conditions, you can 
actually cause more accidents than you would have 
had if you simply didn't detect it and let the 
inherent failure progression of the mode take its 
natural course. 
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Figure 8. Accidents rate as a function of 
diagnostic system unreliability. 
The important message here is that in trying to 
utilize a rigorous approach in looking at the prob-
lem, we end up defining some of the criteria that 
you then later apply to an adequate diagnostic 
system. In summary, after looking at all of the 
aircraft systems, the major needs that emerged were, 
l) improved detection of the shaft and gear cracks 
in transmission for accident reduction 2) the 
reduction of erroneous removals of transmissions 
and 3) the reduction of in-flight aborts, both 
necessary and unnecessary. 
Now, improved detection can be accomplished in 
two basic approaches, as shown on Fig. 9. You can 
invent a nevi technique or you try to improve the 
old one. Improvement of old techniques can be done 
in three ways: you can change the threshold, the 
logic, or you can change the use intervals, inspect 
more frequently or less frequently as the case may 
be. 
I INVENT NEW TECHNIQUE <DIFFERENT SENSING 
PROCESS) 
I IMPROVE EXISTING SYSTEMS THRU: 
DETECTION THRESHOLD 
LOGIC 
- LISE INTERVAL 
Figure 9. Methods of improving detection systems. 
What I would like to do is run through some of 
the things that the Army has tried to do in these 
kinds of categories. For instance, in the new tech-
nique area, in addressing the shaft and gear crack 
problems, some of the research v1e're doing is with 
a vibration detection technique using a very high 
frequency carrier, like 200 to 300KHz. Figure 10 
shows the result of a test for gear tooth cracking. 
What we did here is put a saw cut through the root 
of the tooth in a bevel gear, ran it about 270 per-
cent load to try to get the crack to progress. 
\~hat you see there are nice spikes that occurred 
as the crack progressed. So, there is some hope 
that we perhaps have a technique for detecting this 
heretofore undetectable mode. Of course, it still 
has to pass the test of some rigorous cost effect-
iveness analysis. 
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fiH.QULitCY IH!) 
Figure 10. Spiral bevel gear crack progression 
test. 
In terms of improving the existing techniques, 
the first thing we have to do is recognize that the 
primary diagnostic technique for helicopter trans-
missions is oil borne debris. Figure 11 indicates 
that 55 percent of the removals are caused by some 
sort of oil contamination, whether it be through a 
filter examination, soao analysis, or the notorious 
chip detector. Noise and vibration, that is, per-
sonally observed noise and vibration, is the next 
major cause. It is a large source of our false 
removals, just as in the oil contamination area. 
The miscellaneous visual observations such as oil 
pressure indicator fluctuations are the last group 
of symptoms. 
Figure 11. Debris in oil causes 55% of failure 
warnings. (Data from 193 CH-47 and 56 
CH-46 transmission). 
Before we can start to improve the false re-
movals from debris, the first thing we have to do 
is basically quantify the relationship between the 
various levels of failure degradation and the de-
tection signature, as illustrated in Fig. 12. It 
is so fundamental that we shouldn't have to put a 
chart up to remind anybody, and yet the amount of 
knowledge, that we currently have in this area is 
disgraceful, woefully inadequate. We have optimized 
our diagnostic systems through gut feel for so many 
years that we no longer recognize that the poor 
engineers.who are now trying to optimize it simply 
don't have this fundamental information available. 
SYMPTOM 
OP 
PROGRESSION 
TO 
!'A.ti.UIIl!! 
(IIHITa 
ll1Rii0WIIl 
~BIZURE 
NOISE 
~
~ 
TEIU'ERAT!JIUI 
-
~ s~ ------------------~ 
VIBRATION AIIALYSis--------~lllo 
'l'Dill 'l'IWIS>IISSlCOI liAS OPIIM9DO 
WI'l'll SPALI.£0 RACll 
(llOl!M'IOftS~) 
Figure 12. Crucial failure relationships. 
Some of the work the Army is funding in this 
area, recognizing this problem, are research pro-
grams where we're examining the filters that have 
captured most of the debris in the oil and trying 
to quantify the various particle distributions of 
good and bad transmissions so we can begln to draw 
that distinction and understand where that threshold 
might be. 
Figure 13 shows slides of some debris from 
failed transmissions. You can see the lower left 
one has some bronze from the cage and the upper 
left one has some rather large particles. There 
are obviously some 4,000 micron boulders floating 
around in the oil system. There is a certain reality 
here to the particle sizes floating around in a 
complex helicopter transmission that is not recog-
nized by many people. Certainly engine lubrication 
systems run a little bit cleaner than these do, 
and this has got to be recognized in trying to 
optimize the diagnostic system. 
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A9-724 
(1, 75 Hours) 
J-\9-i~B 
(UNKNO,\N HOURS j 
1\9-1245 
(1. 75 lJOUHS) 
:t~N./:. 
..... ~-~.· . - .. ~¥
- •. . "'. 
~~~-~ 
,:-.,9-12-;s 
\U~KKo:·,',;; 
5CA.lJ~: .06 Jn lSOO microns -t--· 
Figure 13. Examples of debris from failed 
transmissions. 
We can convert these debris samples to some 
distributions. Figure 14 is an example of some 
work we just recently finished. This is a failed 
transmission particle size distribution. If you 
overlay the good transmissions on it you will begin 
to see that there is an awful tight overlap, and 
you conclude that you only begin to get some real 
distinction out at around 1500 microns. That's 
the kind of information that we need to change 
thresholds to improve our existing detection systems. 
PARTICLE SIZE IN MICROMETERS 
Figure 14. Large particle size distributions on 
CH-47 transmissions. 
Once the signature to failure relationships 
are known, you can pick any threshold you want. 
\~e're trying to indicate on Fig. 15 that with any 
threshold of degradation level you end up getting 
different probability of false indications as well 
as the probability of missing a failure. 
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ACTUAL DEGREE OF DEGRADATION 
TEST DATA 
MINIMUM NUMBER OF FALSE INDICATIONS 
MINIMUM NUMBER OF UNDETECTED FAILURES 
MINIMUM NUMBER OF FALSE FAILURE INDICATIONS 
PROBABILITY OF UNDETECTED FAILURE 
PROBABILITY OF FALSE FAilURE INDICATION 
RLI RL2 RL3 RL4 RLS 
,3 . 0.19 0 D.63 0.06 0.44 
,2 . 0.25 0.63 0 0.44 0.06 
Figure 15. Sensitivity of false indication to 
reject limits (RL). 
Other things we're doing is exploring with 
"and/or" logic. To illustrate, Fig. 16 displays 
how we could get different cumulative probabilities 
of false indications given some inherent reliabili-
ties of an individual sensor. 
I. 000000 
c 
0 
~ 
"' u
" c 0. I 00000 
., 
'-
:l 
"' .... 0.010000 
., 
.10 
"' .... 
..... 
0 
?; 0.001000 
-"' 
"' ..:> 0 
'- 0.000100 c.. 
-" 
'-
0 
~ 
<lJ 
z 
'-
0.000010 
5: 
c 
<lJ 
' 
'"" 0.000001 
l.,..---
/ v ____ .. 
-
-
I 
// 
~ 
/ 
I ," --
.,· 
io-'" 
7 
/ 
/ 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0. I 0 
Individual Sensor Probabi I ity of 
False Failure lndicati·on 
OR-Gate Log1c 
---- AND-OR Voting Logic 
Figure 16. Three basic types of fault isolation 
logic on the probability of undetected 
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The last area of improvement is inspection 
interval. Figure 17 is a plot of cumulative proba-
bility of detection versus the frequency at which 
you do an inspection with different progression 
intervals. I think what you see there is the problen 
we face of having to understand what is the failure 
progression interval of the failure modes we're 
trying to detect. Obviously, if it's 10 hours it's 
one thing; if it's 300 you would optimize it in an 
entirely different inspection interval. And again, 
here I must admit that our information is woefully 
inadequate. Utilizing in-service experience, in-
formation is simply truncated by whenever the diag-
nostic system took the failure out. Since we don't 
run our military systems for analysts, we don't 
let failures go all the way through to some catas-
trophic nature; we have to rely on R and D funding 
and limited test programs to fill the information 
gap in that area. They are obviously very critical 
to our understanding of failure progression levels. 
Figure 17. Detection probability as a function of 
progression interval and inspection 
interval. 
Charlie Smith has previously alluded to our 
caution in moving the chip detectors out of the 
cockpit. It arises from our lack of understanding 
of failure progression intervals from all the com-
mon failure modes that we might see in the trans-
mission, and research only can fill this gap. Cer-
tainly, the traditional bearing spalling due to 
subservice fatigue is definitely 200 to 300 hours 
in our low speed transmission application, but there 
may be other failure modes which we must detect that 
may be considerably less than that. 
I want to move on now to give you an example of 
some of the system evaluations we have been attempt-
ing to do recently. Figure 18 illustrates there-
sults from a recent study where various diagnostic 
systems were examined. We tried to evaluate these 
different configurations in a given situation 
This happens to be a low utilization situation of 
only 10 hours a month (we did others at higher 
utilizations, such as 60 or 80 hours a month which 
would represent a combat situation) and tried to 
quantify the accidents, for instance, due to both 
missed failures as well as those aborts, those acci-
dents caused by precautionary landings that I noted 
before. The number of in-flight aborts (in their 
own right as a mission abort parameter), the remov-
als, both valid, false and the scheduled removals 
and the availability were all quantifi~d. The next 
table (Fig. l '}) simply takes all those parameters 
and converts them to a standard measure of life 
cycle costs. 
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Rather startling results emerged. It is a fact 
of life that in the current usage of helicopter 
systems, basically, the wholesale delivery of goods, 
it is extremely difficult to justify hioh cost air-
borne diagnostic systems. There are simply not 
enough benefits to be achieved to amortize, if you 
will, both the acquisition and the development 
cost, let alone the 0 and M cost of the diagnostic 
system. 
Those are some examples of the Army's Rand 0 
approach in the diagnostics area. I think they re-
flect the methods I have earlier defined and pro-
duced a rigorous evaluation process. They first 
identify the problem and then try to fit some solu-
tions to the problem. I would really encourage 
this group to look at the Army's problems and see 
if they don't have some solutions to these problems. 
I would encourage you to maintain a vigilance on 
the problems that you are trying to address. Con-
sider the cost effectiveness of them. 
Figure 19. Transmission subsystem life cycle costs. 
DISCUSSION 
OR. MOW: We can take one or two questions. 
DR. JOSEPH JOHN (IRT): I want to focus attention on the failed transmissions. I have heard a similar 
remark made several times now on the EPRI analysis. 
OR. RUMMEL: What analysis? 
DR. JOHN: EPRI analysis of the oil. Are there statistically meaningful data that exist now after 
analyzing some failed transmissions as to what you find in the oil, the particle size and elements? 
DR. RUMMEL: The data you saw here, I must say with some regret, is about the best particle size distri-
bution work that I've seen in complex transmissions. We're not very satisfied with it; it's a 
limited number of samples. There are a lot of problems in doing the data analysis whether you want 
to do metal or all particles, whether you're looking at just ferrous metals, whether you want to 
talk about shapes, whether you want to talk about particles that have been machined or pressed 
together going through gears. I'm not sure I'm answering your question. Yes, there is some quanti-
tative display and distribution of particle sizes that are in the oil all the way from the smallest 
one micron soap type sample up to the largest 5,000 micron size. 
DR. JOHN: Is that available on other transmissions or only for---
245 
DR. RUMMEL: I really don't know. I don't know how generic those distributions are. We just recently, 
honestly, started to do that work. We've done it on our new UTTAS, and on some CH-47 transmissions. 
I don't know whether the differences are due to the complexity of the transmission, the filtration 
levels which are different in those two transmissions, orwhat. 
DR. JOSEPH HEYMAN (NASA, Langley): Kirk, would you care to mention something about the fact that a number 
of people have set different criteria on particle size as to relative predictability of failures, 
especially in oil lubricated systems? 
DR. RUMMEL: I'm not sure I understand your question, Joe. Certainly the lower particle sizes are repre-
sented by the traditional spectrographic oil analysis program that is in use in the Air Force, Navy 
and Army programs, and that is a very viable tool, an important tool, for detecting many failure 
modes, particularly those failure modes which generate only the small debris. I'm thinking of spline 
wear and gear fretting. We're very concerned that perhaps we're going to infringe on the soap relia-
bility with the fine filtrations that we're now going to. 
Larger particle sizes, in our mind, seem to be where the action is. We can pick up later stages 
of failure and we feel we can let the transmissions run into those stages of failure and eliminate a 
lot of false removal that comes through wear and tear and the high quantities of particles that are 
generated at lower particle sizes. Did I answer your question, Joe? 
I'm not sure how much difference of opinion there is in the technical community. I think most 
people accept the importance of soap. I think there are a lot of people who feel that its false 
removal rate is a bit too high and, indeed, there are programs going, particularly in the Navy; 
the Navy is doing some nice work in the soap area trying to improve their thresholds for soap detec-
tion. The Army has done some fine work in trying to evaluate how to take the sample, where to take 
it, how long to let the oil settle, etc. I don't think there's any disagreement on that. I think 
the disagreement may lie in how big the particle size is where the area of discrimination is. If 
this is what you're alluding to, and I do think there's a lot of open questions, what can I say, 
send money. Then we might be able to answer that question. 
See you next year. 
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